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DR. SCOTT B. GUERNSEY

Personal Website

 

BIO

Current Profile

Dr. Guernsey is a postdoctoral research associate at the University of Cambridge's Judge Business School and an advisory editor for the Review of Financial Studies. His research interests focus on empirical corporate finance, corporate governance, innovation, competition, capital structure, and law and finance. Dr. Guernsey's research has been on several high quality conference programs including the Adam Smith Corporate Finance Workshop, the American Finance Association (AFA) Annual Meeting, the AFA Ph.D. Student Poster Session, the Cass M&A Research Centre Conference, the NBER Law and Economics Meeting, the North American SFS Cavalcade (x2), the Paris December Finance Meeting, and the PRI: Principles for Responsible Investment Conference, among others. His papers have won multiple awards at conferences and have been listed in several of SSRN's eJournal Top Ten download lists; he is in the top 10% of authors on SSRN by total new downloads within the last 12 months. Dr. Guernsey completed his Ph.D. in Finance (in 4-years) from the University of Oklahoma and his dissertation committee was comprised of Lubomir Litov (co-Chair), William Megginson (co-Chair), Martijn Cremers, Scott Linn, and Wayne Thomas. He will be on the upcoming tenure-track job market (for the first-time) and will be available for interviews at the 2019 FMA Meeting and the 2020 AFA Meeting.

 

CV

 

UPCOMING EVENTS

Conference Presentations

December 11-12, 2019

KWC CONFERENCE ON ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE

Lund, Sweden

January 4, 2020

2020 AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING

Ph.D. Student Poster Session

 

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENT

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
POSTDOCTORAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATE

July 2018 - Present

Judge Business School
Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance (CERF)

 

OTHER AFFILIATION

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ADVISORY EDITOR

August 2019 - Present

 

EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
PH.D. IN FINANCE

August 2014 - May 2018

Price College of Business

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
B.S. APPLIED MATHEMATICS

August 2012 - May 2014

Departmental Honors
Magna Cum Laude

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
M.B.A. FINANCE CONCENTRATION

January 2011 - July 2012

Anderson School of Management

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
B.A. ECONOMICS AND COMMUNICATION

August 2006 - December 2010

Summa Cum Laude

 

WORKING PAPERS

COMPETITION, NON-PATENTED INNOVATION, AND FIRM VALUE

Job Market Paper

Reject and Resubmit, Journal of Financial Economics

SSRN Link

This paper studies how competition impacts non-patented corporate innovation and firm value by exploiting adoptions of state anti-plug molding laws – laws that prohibit “unscrupulous” reverse engineering by competitors – and their subsequent invalidation by the U.S. Supreme Court. Firms decrease patenting activity following the laws’ adoptions while also showing increasing investment spending, profitability, and value. Value gains are larger for firms at greater risk of imitation, and that are more innovative. After the laws are overturned, firms reinitiate patenting whereas prior investment spending, profitability, and value gains dissipate. These results suggest that more intense product market competition disincentivizes value-enhancing corporate innovation.

SHADOW PILLS, ACTUAL PILL POLICY, AND FIRM VALUE

with Martijn Cremers, Lubomir Litov, and Simone Sepe

Revise and Resubmit, Review of Financial Studies

SSRN Link

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper (519/2019)

Awarded "Best paper of the Conference" by the AEFIN (Spanish Finance Association) 

We analyze the impact of the right to adopt a poison pill – a “shadow pill” – on actual pill policy and firm value by exploiting the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered adoption of poison pill laws that validated the pill as a takeover defense. We document that a strengthened shadow pill promotes the use of actual poison pills and increases firm value – especially for acquisition targets, and more innovative firms or firms with stronger stakeholder relationships. Our findings suggest shadow pills create value for some firms by increasing their bargaining power in takeovers and reducing their contracting costs with stakeholders.

KEEPING SECRETS FROM CREDITORS: THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE

with Kose John and Lubomir Litov

Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

SSRN link

This paper examines the impact of trade secrets-based intangibility on capital structure by exploiting the quasi-natural experiment provided by staggered adoptions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) which codified protection of trade secrets in 46 U.S. states from 1980 to 2013. We document that enhanced trade secrets protection results in significant reductions in financial leverage, especially for firms more ex-ante reliant on secrecy. We also find the UTSA leads to more secrecy by incentivizing greater overall investments in intangibles and away from patents. Our findings support the asset pledgeability hypothesis whereby greater firm intangibility magnifies contractibility problems with creditors.

STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION AND FIRM VALUE

with Martijn Cremers and Simone Sepe

SSRN Link

Best Paper Award in Corporate Finance/Financial Institutions at the 2019 FMA European Conference

This paper analyzes the relation between enhanced director discretion to consider stakeholder interests (“stakeholder orientation”) and firm value by considering the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered adoption of directors’ duties laws in 35 U.S. states from 1984 to 2006. We find that these laws result in significant increases in shareholder value, especially for firms that are larger, more complex or innovative and with stronger stakeholder relationships. Our results suggest that stakeholder orientation creates value for some firms by reducing contracting costs with stakeholders and mitigating the externalities stakeholders may bear due to conflicts of interests with shareholders.

 

TEACHING EVALUATIONS

INVESTMENTS

Instructor

Summer 2015: Evaluation Report (4.7/5.0)

Fall 2016: Evaluation Report (4.7/5.0)

Summer 2017: Evaluation Report (4.8/5.0)

Fall 2017: Evaluation Report (4.5/5.0)

 

CONTACT INFORMATION

Cambridge Judge Business School
University of Cambridge
Trumpington St
Cambridge CB2 1AG
UK

 
 
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